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COMPENSATION FOR "MEASURES TANTAMOUNT TO 
EXPROPRIATION" UNDER NAFTA: 
WHAT IT MEANS AND WHY IT MATTERS 
Jef/j'e), Tllrk* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. implementing legislation pursuant to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed into law on December 8, 1993 by 
President William 1. Clinton amidst a swarm of controversy.' The agreement 
crcated a frec trade zone bctwcen Mexico, Canada, and thc Unitcd Statcs. Much 
of thc initial discussion in thc United States involving NAFTA centercd on its 
constitutionality and the benefits of frec tradc betwecn the thrce signatorics in 
gencraJ.2 In recent years, the debate has largely shifted to the investment rights 
provisions detailed in Chapter II. This chapter has been described as "the biggest 
threat to United States judicial independence that no one has heard of and even 
fewer people understand."} Senator John Kerry, expressing his disapproval of the 
provision, stated, "not a single word was uttered in discussing Chaptcr 11. Why? 
'J.D., UCLA School of Law: B.S., Industrial & Labor Relations, Cornell University. Mr. Turk is 
currently a staff attorney at Paul, Weiss, Ritkind, Wharton and Garrison. The author would like to thank Jean 
Turk for introducing him to NA~TA's Chapter II, and Professor Richard Steinberg for giving him the incentive 
to author this paper. The views expressed are solely those of the author. 
I S('I' JErFReY DlI'IOfI FT AI." INTFR'IAfiONAL LA\\,: NORMS, ACTORS, PRon.ss 289 (Aspen Pubs. 
20(2). 
2 See. e.g .. Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (II th ('ir. 200 I): s('c a/so 139 
CONti. RIC. E3128 02 (1993) (statement of Rep. Frank). 
3 Adam Liptak, R(!l'icll' of' U.S. Rlllillgs hl' Na/ta Trihllllll/S Stirs ff()rries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,2004, 
atA20. 
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Because we didn't know how this provision would play out. No one really kncw 
just how high thc stakes would gct."" Abncr Mikva, a formcr congressman, and 
a member of a tribunal established undcr Chapter II opined that "[i]f Congress 
had known that there was anything like this in NAFTA they would never have 
voted for it."5 
The clause generating this discussion enables investors fi'om member 
countries to bring personal claims against NAFTA governments for expropriating 
property and provides for the recovery of damages. 6 Due to a lack of clarity in 
NAFTA's express language, and the paucity of final arbitral decisions 
interpreting Chapter 11, the extent of this right is still unclear. 
Although NAFTA is relatively ncw, the debate over the international 
law standard governing expropriation has been rootcd in North American politics 
since at least the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1915, Mexico began 
nationalizing private property belonging to U.S. citizens.7 Mexico maintained 
that they had a right under international law to deny compensation for "expropri-
ations of a gcneral and impersonal character."x The United States however, 
supported the Hull Doctrine, named aftcr Secretary of State Cordell Hull, which 
asserts: "no government is entitled to expropriatc private property; for whatcver 
4Id. 
5id. 
6 See Ray C. Jones. NAFTA Chapla I I IIllTslor-lo-SI£lle DisplIle Resollllion: A Shield 10 Be 
Elllhraced or (/ Sword 10 be Feared, 2002 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 527 (2002): see also Mary Bottari, N.1FT4:, IIll'cslor 
"Righls .... A COll1orale Drealll. A Cili~(,/l Nighllllarc, MUll INA I I()NAI. M()NII()R, i\rr. 1,2001, at 9. 
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Issue 1 NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation 
purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment 
therefor."9 While NAFTA seems to have codified the U.S. position in most cases, 
some believe that exceptions to this rule still exist. 
This paper attempts to delineate the scope of the right to recover for the 
expropriation of property under NAFTA, and address the implications of this 
right. It also discusses and rejects the arguments for broad exceptions to the 
general rule of compensation for regulatory expropriations enacted for environ-
mental or social purposes. Part II provides a basic overview of the relevant 
portions of Chapter II, Part III surveys some of the major claims that have been 
submitted for arbitration, and Part IV offers a framework for deciding which 
"expropriations" are compensable. 
states: 
II. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER II 
NAFTA's expropriation provision is contained in Article 1110, which 
No Pm1y shall directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an 
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take 
a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such 
an investment ("expropriation"), except: 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis; 
(c) in accordance with due process of law and the general princi-
ples of treatment provided in Article 1105; and 
(d) upon payment of compensation 10 
Additionally, Chapter 11 creates a unique remedial mechanism for the enforce-
ment of this provision. Unlike traditional dispute resolution proceedings, such as 
9 Letter li'om Cordell Hull. Secretary of Statc. United State,. to the Mexican Ambassador I (Aug. 
22. 193X) J"(.,!,rillted ill DL1'JOfT. slIl'ra note I. at 71. 
10 See North Amcrican Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17. 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 107 Stat. 2057, 32 
I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA I. 
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that employed by the World Trade Organization (WTO), that grant jurisdiction 
only when a government asserts a claim, NAFTA gives individual investors the 
ability to bring claims on their own behalf. I I The stated purpose for the procedure 
is to provide "a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes that assures 
both equal treatment among investors of the Parties in accordance with the 
principle of international reciprocity and due process before an impartial 
tribunal."12 
In addition to the fulfillment of these goals, the NAFTA Chapter 11 
procedure increases the potential for a large number of claims. Individual 
investors usually only consider their own economic interests when deciding 
whether to initiate dispute resolution proceedings, whereas national governments 
arc inclined to take other factors into consideration. 13 Such factors frequently 
dampen enthusiasm for international litigation, and may have foreclosed many 
claims. Commentators disagree about the merits of bypassing the restraining 
influence of government discretion and allowing investors to bring claims on 
their own behalf. Supporters assert that Chapter II forces host states to abide by 
their commitments, while opponents claim that the procedure gives investors an 
"unencumbered stick" to use against member states with policies adverse to their 
interests. 14 
II 1<1. art. 1116( I ). 
12 Id. art. 1115. 
13 Josc:ph A. Strazzcri. A Lucas AI/a/l'sis oj RegulatOr]' h~rp/'()l'riali()l/s Vllil('/' NAFTA CIWIJter 
Elm!ll, 14 GEO. INT'L ENVIL. L. REV. 837, 845 (2002). 
14 See Jason L. Gudofsky, Slteddil/g Ligltt Oil Article 11111 of lite Nortlt Americ{/I/ Free Trade 
AgrcI!Il/cll/ ('ol/('cmil/g Expropriatiolls: All ElIl'imlllllclita/ Casi! S/I/(!J·. 21 Nw. J. 1;-;1'1. L. & Bus. 243. 249 
(2000). 
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Foreign investors may file a claim six months after a NAFTA party has 
allegedly violated Chapter II, and up to three years after the investor knew or 
should have known of the breach. IS Disputes can be submitted to a tribunal 
convened by either the International Center for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) or the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Laws (UNCITRAL).16 Additionally, the arbitrators are instructed to "decide the 
issues in dispute in accordance with [NAFTA] and applicable rules of interna-
tionallaw."17 Arbitral awards have no binding precedential value, and rulings are 
limited to the particular facts of each case. I R 
Remedies for breach of Article 1110 include monetary damages with 
interest and the restitution of property, but remedies may never include punitive 
damages. 19 Investors who prevail at arbitration can enforce the award under the 
New York Convention, which provides for collection of arbitral awards. 20 
Review of the award is possible, however, and disappointed parties can appeal 
the ruling in a domestic court of the country where the arbitration took place. 21 
III. CASES SUBMITTED UNDER C"APTER 11 
Since Chapter 11 came into effect, International Tribunals have issued 
decisions addressing investor rights to compensation for expropriation in eleven 
15 NAFTA arts. 1117(2). 1120( I). 
16 Id. art. 1120. 
17 fd. art. 1130. 
18 1d. art. 1135(1). 
19 !d. art 1134. 
20 Id. art 1135(7). 
21 See .lones, .'III'm note 6, at .'iJ(>. 
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cases. 22 This section provides a brief sketch of two noteworthy examples. These 
cases show the practical ways in which intemational investors have invoked 
Chapter 11, and the ways in which Tribunals have confronted the issues. The 
cases also offer a glimpse of how similar cases may be handled in the future. 
Although these decisions do not carry precedential weight, tribunals typically 
look to earlier cases for direction in making awards. and have historically 
accorded such decisions some weight.23 
A. Metalclad Corp. 
COTERIN, a Mexican corporation, operated a hazardous waste transfer 
station in the Municipality of Guadalcazar, Mexico beginning in 1990.24 On 
September 26, 1991, the Federal Government of Mexico closed the site, and 
COTERIN applied to the municipality for a pennit to construct a hazardous waste 
landfill at the site. This application was rejected. 25 In April 1993, Metalclad 
Corp., a California based company, entered into an option agreement to purchase 
COTERIN. Metalclad continued construction at the site, which was officially 
completed in March 1995. Through negotiations with the federal government, 
22 These cases include Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States; Methanex Corp. v. United States; 
Mondev International Ltd. v. United States; Ethyl Corp. v. Canada; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada; Pope & Talbot, 
Inc. v. Canada; Azinian v. United Mexican States; GAMI Investments Inc. v. United Mexican Statcs; Feldman 
v. United Mexican States; Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States; and Waste Management, Inc. v. United 
Mexican States. For a complete list of cases submitted under Chapter II, s('(' U.S. DI·I'I. 01 SIAH, NAFTA 
I'IVESTOR STATe ARBITRATIONS, ul http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm (iast visited Fe. 2, 20(5). 
23 See. ego Fctdman v. IJnited Mexican States. I(,SID ('ase No. ARB (A/F)/99/l para. 143 (Dec. 
In, 2002) (award) (discussing previously decided Chapter II claims and asserting that its conclusions arc 
consistent with those reachcd in the carlier cases). 
46 
24 United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 BCSC 664 paras. 2, 3, 4 (2001). 
25 Id. paras. 6- 7. 
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Metalclad obtained permission in 1995 to operate the landfill for five years.26 
Shortly thereafter, the local municipality denied Metalclad's application for a 
construction permit. Following fruitless attempts to resolve the matter in 
Mexican courts, Metalclad filed a notice of claim with ICSID alleging violation 
of Chapter 11.27 Prior to the hearing, the governor of the state in which the site 
was located issued a decree creating an ecological preserve in the area containing 
the site, making use of the facility virtually impossible.2x 
The tribunal found that by tolerating the conduct of the municipality, 
Mexico took a measure tantamount to expropriation within the meaning of 
Chapter II. The tribunal further held that the ecological decree amounted to an 
independent expropriation.2,! The court reasoned that Chapter II required 
compensation for "covert or incidental interference with the use of property."30 
Mexico petitioned the award to the Supreme Court of British Columbia. 
The court set aside the first part of the award by ruling that the tribunal had 
incorrectly read a transparency requirement into NAFTA.31 The court, however, 
upheld the tribunal's ruling that the ecological decree was an act tantamount to 
expropriation. 32 
Metalclad is noteworthy as the first instance in which NAFTA justified 
compensation to an investor for an act tantamount to expropriation. It also 
26 Id. para. 13. 
27 Id. paras. 15 -I h. 
28 Id. para. 17. 
29 Id. para. 35. 
30 Id. para. 103. 
31 Id. para. 79. 
32 Id. para. 91. 
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provides a stark example of the effect Chapter 11 can have on legislation in 
general, particularly environmental regulation. In this case, Mexico was 
effectively ordered to pay private damages for converting a hazardous waste 
landfill into an ecological preserve. Had Mexico known that it would be forced 
to pay for this decision, it might have been less likely to take this action. Chapter 
11 's ability to chill socially beneficial legislation, and the concomitant restriction 
on state sovereignty, is the major objection for those opposed to investment rights 
provIsIOns. 
Substantial political fallout would result from interpreting Chapter II in 
a way that would frequently cause member nations to pay foreign investors for 
legislation. Perhaps understanding this, other tribunals have read this section 
much more narrowly and denied compensation. One example of this is S.D. 
Myers v. Canada. 
B. S.D. Myers 
The investor in this case was an Ohio-based corporation, whose business 
included the disposal of a highly toxic chemical substance called polychlorinated 
biphenyl (PCBs).33 Since 1980, U.S. law had prohibited the cross-border 
transport of PCBs except in rare circumstances.34 In October 1995, the U.S. 
granted S.D. Myers (SDMI) "enforcement discretion" to begin importing 
Canadian PCBs.35 SDMI would have profited greatly from this authorization, 
48 
33 S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, NAFl,;\'UNCITRAL Trib. paras. X9, 90 (2()03) (partial award). 
34 Iii. para. I () I. 
35 !d. para. II X. 
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since it would have been able to treat the materials more efficiently than any 
Canadian facility, in part because the Ohio plant was substantially closer to the 
majority of the Canadian waste than its nearest Canadian competitorY' The 
Canadian disposal industry responded by lobbying the Canadian government to 
close the border to the export of PCBs)7 The Canadian government enacted 
legislation effectively preventing SDMI from importing PCBs for approximately 
eighteen months, after which Canada agreed to maintain an open border to PCB 
exporPX 
SDMI claimed that the Canadian government's actions were tantamount 
to an expropriation, but the tribunal disagreed. The tribunal explained: 
"[ a]n expropriation usually amounts to a lasting removal of the 
ability of an owner to make use of its economic rights although 
it may be in some contexts and circumstances, it would be 
appropriate to view a deprivation as amounting to an expropria-
tion, even if it were partial or temporary."39 
The tribunal found that the phrase 'tantamount to expropriation' was included "to 
embrace the concept of so-called creeping expropriation rather than to expand the 
internationally accepted scope of the term expropriation."40 Although the tribunal 
agreed with SDMI that there might be some cases in which state regulatory 
conduct could breach Chapter 11, they asserted that in most cases, regulations are 
36 1<1. para. 112. 
37 1d. para. 122. 
38 1<1. para. 127. 
39 1<1. para. 283. 
40 Jd. para. 286. 
49 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW Spring 2005 
"a lesser interference," that do not "involve the deprivation of ownership 
rights."41 
While Metalclad and SDMI used different reasoning to come to different 
results in their respective cases, both tribunals considered similar issues in 
making their rulings. The following section discusses those issues in greater 
detail. 
IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETERMINING WHETHER AN ACT IS "TANTAMOUNT TO 
EXPROPRIATION" 
Three major questions arise in cases submitted under Chapter 11: (1) is 
there a government actor; (2) how much of the investment has been expropriated; 
and (3) why has the investment been expropriated. This section explains the 
importance of these three questions, explains how each must be answered before 
compensation is available, and discusses why finding the answers to these 
questions has been contentious. 
A. Is There (/ Government Actor: 
As a threshold matter, a government actor must cause economic harm for 
an aet to be characterized as an expropriation. The most obvious example arises 
when the federal government of one of the NAFTA parties has caused the harm. 
S.D. Myers is an example of this type of occurrence, because the investor claimed 
that the Canadian government expropriated its property by prohibiting the 
exportation of PCBs. However, claims under Chapter 11 are not restricted to 
actions taken by a central government. NAFTA Article 20 I (I) defines "measure" 
41 Id. para. 282. 
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as "any law, regulation, procedure, requirement, or practice."42 This definition 
encompasses an expansive range of activity that can conceivably cover activities 
taken by many governmental entities. 
Indeed, many Chapter II cases have involved measures taken by actors 
outside of the respective central governments. For instance, MethaT/ex CO/po v. 
United States involved a claim by a Canadian company al\eging that a California 
executive order, and the regulations issued in accordance with that order, resulted 
in a compensable expropriation under NAFTA.43 In Methallex, the governor of 
Califol11ia directed the Califol11ia Air Resources Board to ban the use of MTBE, 
a gasoline additive, in Califol11ian gasoline.44 The ban was allegedly instituted as 
a result of a study that had found the additive to be environmentally harmfu1. 45 
Methanex, a Canadian company that produces methanol, an essential ingredient 
in MTBE, disputed the rationale for the ban, and theorized that the actual intent 
was to favor the domestic ethanol industry by eliminating the competition.46 The 
investor alleged that the executive order was tantamount to expropriation as it 
had decreased Methanex's market share by eliminating the primary use for the 
company's product in Califol11ia.47 Similarly, Metalclad Corp., in another arbitra-
42 NAFTA • .I'llpra note 10, art. 201( I). 
43 Methanex Corp. v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib. paras. 20, 22 (2002) (second 
amcnded statement of claim), II\'{/illlhl~ (/( http://www.state.goVidocllments/organization/15035.pdf (last visited 
Jan 24, 20(4). 
44 M para. 20. 
45 Iii. para. 21. 
46 Iii. para. 15R. 
47 Jd. para. 317. 
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tion ruling, was awarded damages stemming from a decree issued by the 
governor of a Mexican state. 4X 
Moreover, claims are not limited solely to measures taken by executive 
or legislative bodies. Courts have likewise been found to have ordered measures 
tantamount to expropriation. For example, a Canadian conglomerate called the 
Loewen Group filed a Chapter II claim challenging a $500 million jury verdict 
rendered in a Mississippi state court.49 The seeds of that claim were sown when 
a local businessman brought suit against Loewen in state court asserting a 
relatively minor dispute seeking $5 million in damages. 5o 
Throughout the subsequent trial, the plaintitT's attorney stressed the fact 
that Loewen was a rich Canadian corporation attempting to profit at the expense 
of the poor citizens of Mississippi. 51 The attorney flagrantly stroked the jurors' 
passions on the issues of nationality, race, and social status.52 The jury responded 
by awarding $100 million in compensatory damages and $400 million in punitive 
damages, the largest award in Mississippi history.53 Loewen filed a NAFTA 
Chapter 11 claim based on the unfair tactics allowed at trial and a tribunal held 
that NAFTA conferred jurisdiction to hear cases based on judicial "takings."54 
The tribunal reasoned that "the conduct of an organ of the State shall be consid-
ered as an act of the State under International law whether the organ be legisla-
4S Sec United Mexican States v. Metalciad Corp., 200 I BCSC hM paras. 15, I h (200 I) 
49 Loewen Group v. United States. [CSID Case No. ARB (AF)/9XI3 para. 117 (Oct. 30, 199X) 
(notice of ciaim). 
52 
50 I. 0" \I'(!/I, ICSID Casc No. ARB (AFjI'JXi3 para. 37 (June 26, 20(3) (award). 
5[ Id. paras. 54 70. 
52 1d. 
53 Id. para. 104, 
54 Lo"we/l, ICSID Case No. ARB (AFj/9X/3 para. 70 (Jan. 5. 2001 j (award on jurisdiction). 
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tive, executive or judicial, whatever position it holds in the organization of the 
State. "55 In its subsequent award, the Loewen tribunal clarified its position on this 
issue by emphasizing that only final, non-appealable judicial rulings can serve as 
the basis for Chapter II jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to attach, an investor must 
"exhaust remedies which are effective and adequate and are reasonably available 
to the complainant in the circumstances in which it is situated."56 In Loewen, the 
tribunal denied the investors' claim in part because of Loewen's failure to fully 
utilize the United States appellate process before pursuing Chapter 11 remedies.57 
In drafting Chapter II, the NAFTA signatories sought to include activi-
ties taken by a wide range of government actors. This is shown by the inclusion 
of the word "practice" in the definition of the word "measure" in Article 201( I pR 
The Canadian government espoused this view in an official statement by 
asserting that "[t]he tenn 'measure' is a non-exhaustive definition of the ways in 
which governments impose discipline in their respective jurisdictions."59 It will 
be interesting to see whether actions taken by other governmental actors are 
challenged as tribunal case law develops further. 
B. How Much Has Been Taken? 
While it is generally agreed that the tenn "measure" has an expansive 
definition for Chapter II purposes, defining the phrase "tantamount to expropri-
55 !d. 
56 LOell'el/, ICSID Casc No. ARB (AF)/9S/3 para. 16R (June 26. 20(3) (award). 
57 Id. para. 217. 
5R NAFTA. supra note 10. art. 201( I). 
59 North American Free Tradc Agreemcnt. Canadian Statcment on Implemcntation. C. GAl:. 
1994.1.6R (.ian. I. 19(4). (Imi/"h/" ,,/ http://www.dhtit-macci.gc.ca/tna-nac/doclImcnts/N II JAN I 994.pdf (last 
\ isitcd Jan. 26. 20(5). 
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at ion" has been contentious.60 The Vienna Convention, the authoritative guide to 
treaty interpretation, states: "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in light of its objects and purpose."61 SpecificaIly defining the 
expropriation clause in NAFTA, however, has been difficult, since the treaty 
itself does not offer a definition. Consequently, this topic has been the subject of 
much dispute in internationallaw.62 
Clearly, tribunals must view alleged governmental takings from the point 
of view of the investor, rather than the state. It docs not matter whether or not the 
government has received a benefit from the act. The Metalclad tribunal stressed 
this point by stating that an expropriation can occur even when there is no 
"obvious benefit [to] the host state."63 The significant issue is to what extent has 
state action caused the investor to lose his investment. 64 
Two separate yet related issues are embodied by the second question 
regarding how much was taken: the extent of the tangible scope of the taking, and 
the temporal nature of the taking. This section deals with each of these issues in 
turn. 
60 SO! David A. Gantz, SOllie COIIIIIIl'1I1s Oil NAFTE C/l!lpll'r If, 42 S. TFx. L. Rev. 12X5, 1294 (2001 ). 
61 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opellnl lor sigIlO/III'1! May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1195 
U.N.T.S. 331, g I.L.M. 679 [hereinalkr Vienna Conventionj. 
62 SI'i!, I'.g., Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 39g ( 19(4) ('There arc few if any issues 
in international law today in which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a statc's power to 
expropriate the property of aliens. "). 
63 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97i1 para. 103 (Aug. 30, 
20(0) (award). 
64 This approach was also used by thc Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. See George H. Aldrich, What 
COlls/i/llles (/ COlllpel/.\'(/h/e Takillg o(Pmpl'I'/r:' TIlL' /)ecisiolls "(lite frall-Ulli/ed Slo/es Claillls Trihl/l/(/I, gg 
AM. J. l'Ir'L L. 585, 609 (1994). 
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1. Tangible scope of the taking 
Perhaps the most critical issue in deciding whethcr an act rises to the 
level of expropriation, is the scope of the effect on the investment. It has been 
argued that even acts that have a relatively small efIect can amount to a compen-
sable expropriation. An example of this can be found in the notice of arbitration 
in Ethyl, which involved a Canadian ban on the use of a gasoline additive not 
manufactured in Canada.65 The investor claimed that expropriation exists 
"whenever there is a substantial and unreasonable interference with the 
enjoyment of a property right."(J6 This statement reflects two ideas, the tirst being 
that compensation is owed for substantial inteljerence. Although this phrase is 
subject to iilterpretation, a substantial interference means something less than a 
total loss. The second idea relates to the investor's use of the term "unreasonable 
interference," which is discussed below. 
AsscI1ing an cven more expansive definition of expropriation, the 
Loewen Group, in its claim protesting the actions of the Mississippi state court, 
argued that: "under international law an expropriation occurs where government 
action interferes with an alien's use and enjoyment of property."67 This is the 
broadest definition possible, since it calls for compensation for even minimal 
government interference. 
Some commentators argue that whilc minimal governmental interference 
is not compensable, "taking most of an owner's property is likely sufficient to 
claim). 
65 Ethyl Corp. v. Canada. NAFTAIUNCITRAL Trib. para. II (Oct. 2. 1997) (statcmcnt of claim). 
661'1hyl Corp. v. Canada. NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib. para. 32 (Apr. 14.1997) (notice of arbitration). 
67 Loewcn Group v. United States. I(,SID Casc No. ARB (AF)/9X/3 para. 1 M (1998) (notice of 
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establish an expropriation."6x This standard would also require compensation for 
something less than a total imposition on an investor's property rights. 
Claimants who argue for an expansive definition point to Alticle 1110's 
express language. They say that the inclusion of the phrase "tantamount to 
expropriation," in addition to the inclusion of both direct and indirect expropria-
tions, implies that the drafters of NAFTA sought to give investors rights greater 
than those found under intemational law.69 
Other commentators have argued for a more exacting standard. For 
instance, 1. Martin Wagner stated: "[B]efore measures restricting the rights of 
owners to use and dispose of their property will be considered to amount to 
expropriation, it must be apparent that the govemmental actions have so 
completely deprived the owners of their property rights that the rights are 
rendered nugatory."70 Obviously, this standard is far more difficult to meet than 
that supported by investors. 
The first NAFTA tribunal to address this issue was the tribunal hearing 
Pope & Talhot v. Canada. 71 That case involved a Canadian regulation limiting the 
free export of softwood lumber manufactured in certain parts of Canada.72 In 
finding that Canada did not violate Article 1110, the tribunal stated that NAFTA's 
68 Gudofsky, supra note 14, at 255. 
69 See, eg., Ana Tschen, Cha/)Ier //: The qtorl.\ 10 !Jetille E'I'I'OJIrialioll, X Cl:RIU" I s: I" I'l. TRADe. 
L.J. 50, 54 (1999). 
70 1. Martin Wagncr, Illtematiollal "/l'ntll/I!III, Etpropriatioll alld EIII'irolllllelllal Protectioll. 29 
GOLDeN GAtE U. L. REV. 465, 522 (1999). 
71 Po pc & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, NAfTA/UNCITRAL Trib. para. 96 (June 26, 20(0) (interim merits 
award). 
72 Pope, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib. para. 15 (Mar. 25,1999) (statement of claim). 
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language does not broaden "the ordinary concept of expropriation under interna-
tional law ... without regard to the magnitude or severity of that effect."7.1 The 
tribunal further explained that 
[w]hile it may sometimes be uncertain whether a particular 
interference with business activities amounts to an expropria-
tion, the test is whether that interference is sufficiently restrictive 
to support a conclusion that the property has been 'taken' from 
the owner. Thus the Harvard Draft defines the standard as 
requiring interference that would justify an inference that the 
owner will not be able to use, enjoy, or dispose of the property,74 
This definition implies that the investor must face a total loss before an award of 
compensation becomes appropriate. In this case, because the investor still earned 
substantial profits from its investments, and maintained control of its business 
operations, the tribunal determined that no expropriation had taken place.75 
The investors in Meta/clad, on the other hand, substantially lost their 
investment, which was rendered effectively worthless by the governor's ecolog-
ical decree,76 In that case, the tribunal offered a more expansive definition of 
expropriation, defining it as "the open, deliberate and acknowledged taking of 
property, as well as covert or incidental interference with the use of property 
which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the 
use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property."77 The inclusion 
73 Pop", N;\FTAIUNCITR;\L Trib. para. 96 (interim merits award). 
74 Id. para. 101. 
75 1<1. paras. 100. lOS. 
76 Mctalelad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ;\RB(;\F)/97!1 para, 113 (;\ug. 30, 
2(00) (award), ill'IIililhi" ill http://www.ecollomia-snei.gob.mx/sphp_pages/importa/sol eontro/con 
sultoria/Casos Mexico/Metalclad/laudo/laudo ingles.pdf. (last visited Jan. 26, 20(5) (holding that "Mctalclad 
has completely lost its invcstment"). 
77 United Mexican Stales v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 BCSC 664 para. 99 (2001). 
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of the phrase "or in significant part" reflects the idea that even partial takings may 
require compensation. Significantly, the British Columbia court upheld this 
definition as a ruling of lawJX 
However, both Pope & Talhot and S. D. Myers refused to accept the 
proposition that the phrase "tantamount to expropriation" extends an investor's 
rights under international law. Instead, they held that this phrase was included to 
encompass creeping expropriation. 79 This refers to a succession of smaller 
takings, which has the cumulative effect of constituting a total expropriation. xo 
This reading of Chapter II greatly diminishes the utility of the phrase 
"tantamount to expropriation" for investors. In effect, it incorporates the intema-
tionallaw standard for expropriations, while only admitting a duty to look at the 
effect of a number of regulations on an investment to determine whether there has 
been a sufficient impact. 81 
In making its ruling, the Pope & Talhot tribunal declined to use the 
decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal as precedent.82 That tribunal was 
established to adjudicate claims brought by U.S. citizens, whose property had 
78 Jd. 
79 Pop('. NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib. paras. 99, 104 (interim merits award); S.D. Myers v. Canada. 
NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib. para. 286 (2003) (partial award). 
80 S('c Joel C. Beauvais. R!!glliatorl' Eypropriatiolll' UII"('/' N,4FT.·/: ElIIl!Igillg Prillcipln oI/{l 
Lillgerillg DOllbts, 10 N.Y.U. E'I\,TI. LJ. 245, 259 (2002). 
81 The use of the phrase "tantamount to expropriation" in other contexts discussing the international 
law standard for expropriation supports the idea that the inclusion of this phrase in NAFTA does not expand on 
rights accorded under international law. For instancc, thc Intcr-Amcrican Juridical Committee, in its discussion 
of the legality of the Helms-Burton act stated: "Any State that expropriates, nationalizes or takes lIIeasures 
talltalllolllltlo I!Xpropriatioll or l1atiollali~alioll of property owned by foreign nationals must ... I pay I adequate 
and cffective compensation." 35 I.L.M. 1322, 1331 (1996) (cmphasis added). 
82 POP!!, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib. para. 104 (interim merits award). 
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been expropriated by the Iranian government following the revolution in that 
country.X3 Pope & Talbot did not consider the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT) 
to be an appropriate source of precedence because "that Tribunal's mandate 
expressly extends beyond expropriation to include other measures affecting 
property rights. "R4 
This reasoning is dubious. At the very least, decisions by the IUSCT 
should be considered an outer limit for determining which expropriations are 
compensable. R5 Since that tribunal's mandate is arguably broader than that 
provided for by NAFTA, claims which the IUSCT rejected as non-compensable 
should be analogized with similar NAFTA disputes. Furthermore, even though 
the IUSCT's mandate may have been broader, most of their claims were decided 
under customary international law,R6 the same standard applied by NAFTA 
tribunals. Significantly, in some cases, such as Foremost Tehran Illc.,87 the 
IUSCT specified whether it was granting compensation based on international 
law theories, or based on its expansive mandate. RR These discussions can be used 
to determine which cases are directly applicable and which should be treated as 
an outer limit for NAFTAjurisprudence. Consequently, NAFTA tribunals should 
consider many IUSCT decisions to be valid persuasive authority. That tribunal 
R3 See Dl:NOFr, sllpra note I, at 164. 
84 POPI', NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib. para. 104 (interim merits award). 
85 Sel.' Kevin Banks, NAFTA :\. Article 11111 Call Reglliatioll he Etpropriatioll?, 5 NAFTA: L. & 
BlS. RF\,. A~1. 499, 515 (1999). 
R6 See Maurizio Brunetti, NAF7A Chapler 11: The lrall-Ulliled Siaies Cloill1s Trihllllol. NAFTA 
Chopler II. olld Ihe Doctrille o/Illdirect Elpropriolioll, 2 OIl. J. IN 1'1 L. 203, 205 (200 I). 
87 Foremost Tehran Inc., 17Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 153 (19X6). 
88 Aldrich, sllpra note 64, at 590. 
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rendered final decisions in a large number of cases,K9 many of which include facts 
that could be analogized to potential NAFTA disputes. Failure to consider the 
experiences of that tribunal only results in increased uncertainty for both 
investors and states under the relatively new NAFTA scheme. 
The IUSCT discussed the scope of expropriation necessary to entail 
compensation in Starrett HOllsing Corporation v. /ran. 90 In that case, the Iranian 
government took a number of adverse actions against the claimant, culminating 
in the appointment of managers to direct all of Starrett Housing's activities.91 By 
doing so, the Iranian government deprived the claimants of "the effective use, 
control, and benefits of their property rights."n In awarding damages, the 
tribunal explained that: 
[I]t is recognized in international law that measures taken by a 
state can interfere with property rights to such an extent that 
these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to 
have been expropriated, even though the State does not purport 
to have expropriated them and the legal title to the propel1y 
formally remains with the original owner.93 
The phrase "so useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated" is 
strikingly similar to the Pope & Talbot holding that compensation is appropriate 
for "an interference [that] is sufficiently restrictive to support a conclusion that 
the property has been 'taken' from the owner."94 The IUSCT expanded on their 
89 For a till I list of awards and decisions given by the tribunal. see its website at 
http://www.iusct.org/lists-eng.htl11ljlast visited Apr. 5, 20(5) . 
award). 
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. 90 Starrett Housing Corp. 4 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 122 (19K3). 
91 1<1. ~ IV(b). 
92 1<1. 
93 1d. 
94 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, NAI'TA/UNCITRAL Trib. para. 96 (June 26, 20(0) (intcril11l11crits 
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definition in Tippets 1'. frail, by saylllg that compensation is appropriate 
"whenever events demonstrate that the owner was deprived of fundamental rights 
of ownership."95 This idea comports with the Harvard draft's view that only acts 
that remove an owner's ability to "use, enjoy and dispose of' property are 
compensable.9/) The similarity of these holdings demonstrates that the IUSCT 
rulings employed a remarkably similar standard to that articulated by Chapter II 
tribunals. Thus, those decisions should be analyzed in deciding future cases under 
NAFTA. 
It IS widcly recognized in both international and domestic law that 
governments have the right to regulate within their domain without compensating 
those who are negatively affected by the regulation.'n One justification for this 
concept is that investors must pay to operate within a sovereign territory, and 
submission to regulation constitutes such payment. 9X However, governments 
95 Tippets. 6 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 219. 225 (19X4). 
96 POl'e. NAFTA'UNCITRAL Trib. para. 96 (interim merits award). 
97 SeC' Chris Tollefson, GOllles Wilholll Fl'OlIli('l'-'.· 11I1'l'slor Claillls alld Cili~1'1I SlIblllissiollS UII<ia 
Ihl' SAFrA Rl'gillll', 27 YALE 1. II';T'L L. 141,159 (2002) (""It has traditionally been assumcd that governments 
are entitled to take regulatory action that adversely affects the value of a property without paying compensation 
as long as the action is taken in good faith."). Under American domestic law, expropriations are governed by 
the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution which statcs: "lNjor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." U.S. Co>,:,!. amend. V. In Lllcas I'. S.C Coaslal COlilld/, the Suprcme Court ruled 
that a regulation must deny an owner all economically bendicial use of his property to be considered a regula-
tory taking. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Mexican takings law derives from Article 27 of the Mcxiean Constitution 
which states in part: "Private property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of public usc and subject to 
payment of indemnity. The Nation shall at all times haw the right to impose on private property rights the 
limitations dictated by the public interest, as well as to regulate, j()r the collective good, the usc of natural 
resources susceptible to expropriation." MF.X. CONS!. art. 27. Courts have intcrpreted this to mean that compcn-
sation is only required when a taking is directed at a specitic property, and ownership of the property is 
transferred to the State. See Wagner, .I'llI'm note 70, at 517. Under Canadian law, the right to compensation for 
expropriation is not required even fi.lr dircct takings, hut is only considered a matter of statutory interpretation. 
S(,C' R. v. Appleby, 15 N .R.R.2d 650, 659 (1977). 
98 SI!C, I!.g., RuckcJhaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 9R6, 1007 (19R4) ("[S1uch restrictions are the 
burdcns we all must bear in exchange f(lr the advantage of living and doing busincss in a civili7Cd community.") 
(internal quotation omitted). 
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violate this arrangement by enacting regulation that substantially deprives 
investors of the value of their property. In determining whether regulation has 
crossed this line, tribunals should evaluate the expectations of investors. Rarely, 
if ever, does regulation render property utterly valueless. Even the ecological 
decree in Metalclad did not entirely deprive the company of all of the invest-
ment's economic value. The investor in that case still owned an ecologic 
preserve. However, Metalclad's expectation was to own a waste treatment center, 
something that was no longer possible.'!9 As a result, its expectation value was 
essentially worthless, and therefore compensable under Chapter II. The claimant 
in Pope & Talbot on the other hand, was still able to operate its business of choice 
at a profit, albeit a diminished one. Therefore, the claimant still realized part of 
the expectation value of its investment, and no expropriation occurred. 
2. Temporal scope afthe taking 
In determining whether the action is substantial enough to warrant 
compensation, tribunals must address the temporal nature of the taking as well as 
the tangible scope of the imposition on the investment. The IUSCT acknowl-
edged this in Tippets, by saying that an expropriation has occurred whenever "it 
appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral."'oo This arguably gives an 
investor greater protection than that afforded to claimants by NAFTA tribunals to 
date. George Aldrich, a member of the IUSCT, has asserted that the "ephemeral" 
standard means that compensation is appropriate whenever "the terms of the 
99 Sn! Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)i9711 para. 113 (Aug. 
30,20(0) (award) (noting that tvle/alclad faced "the complete frustration of the operation of the landfill"). 
100 Tippets, 6 Iran-U.S.CTR. 219, 225. 
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deprivation denied compensation for any losses that might be incurred while the 
deprivation continued or when the deprivation continued for several years."IOI 
Aldrich's first assertion is unlikely to be accepted by NAFTA tribunals because 
it essentially states that an expropriation for any amount of time is compensable. 
However, his second standard, that the harmful act continue for several years, 
may offer helpful guidance. 
The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations also recogl1lzes that a 
temporary taking may constitute an expropriation. It states: "[a] state is respon-
sible as for an expropriation of property ... that . . . unduly delays, effective 
enjoyment of an alien's propeI1y."I02 This illustrates that expropriations, even if 
temporary, are compensable. 
NAFTA tribunals have In some instances focused on the ephemeral 
quality of a taking. For instance, in S.D. Myers, no compensation was due 
because the offending regulation was only in effect for eighteen months. The 
tribunal stated that this amounted to the mere delaying of an opportunity as 
opposed to an expropriation. 103 In making this determination the tribunal 
acknowledged that "in some contexts and circumstances it would be appropriate 
to view a deprivation as amounting to an expropriation, even if it were partial or 
temporary."I04 
101 Aldrich • .I'llI'm note M. at 593. 
102 RrSTArF\II~r (Tlillw) m F()RII(,~ RFI.MIO'iS L~\\ ~ 712 cm!. g (19R7). 
103 S.D. Mycrs Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib. para. 2R7 (2003) (partial award). 
I04!d. para. 2X3. 
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An analysis of both the NAFTA and Iranian tribunals decisions shows 
that arbitrators have focused on an interplay of factors in determining whether a 
taking amounts to an expropriation under international law. One factor involves 
the degree to which the government's actions interfered with the investor's 
business or investment. Another factor involves a consideration of the period 
over which that interference took place. It is apparent that under both arbitral 
schemes, compensation is appropriate only when the government action renders 
the investment practically useless. This standard is contrary to that espoused by 
some NAFTA Chapter II claimants. 
The temporal aspect however, should not be rigidly defined. Courts must 
look to the circumstances of each case to determine whether an action is 
continued long enough to constitute an expropriation. Different industries in 
different regions assign varying importance to restrictions in time. Eighteen 
months may constitute an ephemeral amount of time in some industries, but a 
virtual eternity in others. The Third Restatement gives support to this view by 
stating: "[ a] temporary deprivation of an alien's control over his property may in 
some cases cause significant injury and give rise to a claim for damage."105 Thus, 
a factual inquiry into the investor's injury is appropriate when determining 
whether non-permanent takings are compensable. NAFTA tribunals can develop 
these factors through case law but should look to the Iranian Claims Tribunal as 
a good starting point for addressing these issues. 
105 RES1AlhiENT (THIRD) OF FORrl(iN REI.AII()NS LAI\ ~ 71211. 6 (19K7). 
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C. Why Has the Government Takell the Action?: Compensatiollfc)" Regulatmy 
Takings 
The third and most controversial question NAFTA tribunals are asked to 
determine is whether compensation is owed to investors who are deprived of 
property as a result of regulation enacted for environmental, safety, public health, 
or other such policy considerations. This section deals with that question and 
concludes that the regulatory character of an expropriation docs not disqualify an 
investor from receiving compensation. It then addresses some potential problems 
with a regime in which such compensation is available, and introduces proposals 
for mitigating some of these difficulties. 
Meta1clad provides a good example of a case in which an investor was 
awarded compensation for a regulatory decree that was purportedly implemented 
for environmental reasons. Many commentators were appalled at this result and 
feared that states would refrain from enacting environmental legislation for fear 
that they would be forced to pay for doing SO.IO(, Others, however, saw compen-
sation as a necessary component of investor protection. lo7 The Pope & Talbot 
tribunal reasoned that, "a blanket exemption for regulatory measures would 
create a gaping loophole in international protections against expropriation."lox 
S.D. Myers also dealt with this issue and the tribunal stated: "Regulatory conduct 
I 06 See, e.g .. Samrat Ganguly, The 1lI,'eslor-Slale Di.I,/!lIle Mechallism (ISD.I/) (/Ild a SOI'ereigll's 
POIl'er 10 I'mlecl Pllhlic I/eallh, 3R C()ll'~1. .I. TRANSN'I L. 113. 119 (1999). 
107 Sel' Strazzcri, sllpra notc 13, at H56 57. 
108 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada. NAFTAIUNCITRAL Trib. para. 99 (.Junc 26. 2(00) (interim 
merits award). 
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by public authorities is unlikely to be the subject of legitimate complaint under 
Aliicle 1110 of the NAFTA, although the Tribunal does not rule out that 
possibility. "I 09 Both tribunals recognized that regulations tend to impact rights to 
a degree not amounting to expropriation under the scope test. However, in cases 
where they do, both tribunals were willing to concede that compensation would 
be appropriate. 
The IUSCT provides guidance in addressing this question as well. Cases 
decided by that tribunal are especially relevant because \11ost of the claims have 
involved governmental actions that did not amount to direct expropriations. llo 
Interestingly, the Iranian tribunal's opinion on this issue evolved over time. 
Originally, the tribunal articulated a test in Sea Land Services Inc. v. Iran. in 
which a "finding of expropriation would require, at the very least, that the 
tribunal be satisfied that there was deliberate governmental interference with the 
conduct of Sea Land's operation."'" 
This standard would inquire into the motives of the governmental actors 
as opposed to the effect of the actions on the investment. However, in subsequent 
cases, starting with Tippets, the tribunal changed its view by stating that '"[t]he 
intent of the government is less important than the effects of the measures on the 
owner, and the form of the measures of control or interference is less important 
than the reality of their impact.""2 The tribunal explained their reasoning for 
66 
109 S.D. Mvers. NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib. para. 2»3 (partial award). 
110 See Brunetti, slIpra note 86, at 20S. 
III Sea-Land Services Inc., (, Iran-U.S. ('I. Trib. Rep. 166 (19R4). 
112 Tippets, 6 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 225 26. 
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employing the new test in Phelps Dodge v. Iran I L1 by stating: "the Tribunal 
understands the economic and social concerns that inspired thc law pursuant to 
which it acted, but those reasons and concerns cannot relieve the Respondent of 
the obligation to compensate [the investor] for its IOSS."114 By enacting this test, 
the tribunal rejected the idea that expropriations in the fonTI of bona fide regula-
tions are not compensable. 
Traditionally, under international law, states have a right to enact legisla-
tion consistent with their police power, without paying compensation. I IS The 
Restatement endorses this view, stipulating: "A state is not responsible for loss of 
property or for other economic disadvantage resulting from bona fide general 
taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action of the kind that is 
commonly accepted as within the police power of states, if it is not discrimina-
tory."116 
Some international cases also advance this theory. For instance, in Haller 
v. Land Rheinlalld-Pfalz, the European Court of Justice upheld a regulation 
II J Phelps Dodge, 10 Iran-LJ .S. ('1. Trib. Rep. 121 (1986). 
114 Id. 
115 Black's Law Dictionary defines police pOlVer as: 
l.The inherent and plenary power of a sovereign to make all lalVs necessary and proper 
to preserve the public security. order. health, morality, and justice. It is u ti.lI1dumcntal 
power essential to government, and it cannot be surrendered by the legislature or irrevo-
cably transferred away Irom government .... 3. Loosely, the power of the government 
to intervene in the usc of privately owned property. 
BLACK'S LA\\' DICII()~AKY 1178 (7th cd. 1999). Similarly, Ballentine's Law Dictionary dctines 
pol icc power in part as: 
An attribute of sovereignty. comprehcnding the power to makc and cnl(lrce all 
wholesome and rca~onablc law~ and regulations necessary to the maintenance, 
upbuilding. and advancement of public weal and protcction of public intcrcsts. That 
power in governmcnt which restrains individuals from transgressing the rights of others, 
and restrains them in their conduct so far as is necessary to protect the rights of all. 
BALlDHlNE'S LA\\' DICTlo'l.\RY 95~ (3d cd. 19(9) (citations omitted). Both dclinitions otler an 
expansive vie\V of police power, which could arguably include all regulation. 
116 RLS I AII·YILN I (TIlIRD) 01 FORI'I(oN RI·I AII()~S LA\\' * 712 cm!. g ( 1987). 
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prohibiting the planting of a certain type of grape vine as non-compensable. 117 
However, that case was decided under the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR) which provides that the right to personal property will not impair 
the right of the state to enact laws necessary to control property use in the general 
interest. I I ~ Another frequently cited example is the Oscar Chinn (UK v. Belgium) 
case, in which the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that states may 
regulate to stimulate an economy in times of severe recession, even when doing 
so bankrupts some enterprises. I 19 
Some commentators have sought to extend police powers to bona fide 
environmental measures, which, they argue, arc non-compensable under 
NAFTA.120 The agreement itself supports this argument by stressing the 
importance of environmental concerns. NAFTA's preamble states the desire of 
the signatories to "undertake [the agreement] in a manner consistent with 
environmental protection and conservation; preserve their flexibility to safeguard 
the public welfare; promote sustainable development; [and] strengthen the 
development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations."121 
Chapter 11 itself emphasizes the imp0l1ance of domestic environmental regula-
tion and states: "1. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party 
117 Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, 119XO] C.M.L.R. 42 (19RO). 
lIS See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Nov. 
4,1950,213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
- 119 Oscar Chinn (U.K. v. Bclg.), 1934 P.c.I.J. (ser. AlB) No. 63 (Dec. 12). 
120 See WagnCf, Sllpra note 70, at 527; see a/so Howard Mann & Konrad von Moltkc, NAFTA :,. 
Cilapler II alld Iile Em'irollll/ell1: Addressillg (/u: III/pacls or Ihe Im'eslor SI(11e Process 0/1 the EI/l'irollll/Oll, 
1999 INT'I.INsJ. SUS1AINABI.lc DI·Y. 40. ami/ahfe 01 http://www.iisd.oIWlxlt/natiaslimmary.pdf(last visited Jan. 
31,20(5). 
121 NAFTA, supra note 10, pmbl. 
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from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure, otherwise consistent with 
this Chapter, that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its 
territory is undel1aken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns."122 
However, the plain language of Article 1110 undercuts the argument 
that such regulatory expropriations are non-compensable. The article allows 
takings to occur for a public purpose and in a non-discriminatory way, but only 
if accompanicd by compensation. In other words, the black lettcr of Chapter II 
demonstrates that Article 1110 is a "no fault provision."123 Even if there were a 
limited exception for certain traditional police measures such as actions taken 
during time of war, and currcncy regulation,124 that exception should not be 
extended to environmental, and other similar regulations. NAFTA stresses the 
importance of environmental regulation, but not at the expense of the investor. 
Extending police power status to environmental legislation causes the exception 
to swallow the rule, and almost any regulation would be justifiable as a police 
power and therefore non-compensable. This concern is recognized in the Pnpe & 
Talbot tribunal's language concerning creeping expropriation, and the broad 
language of Chapter II certainly does not justify creating such a broad exception. 
122 Id. art. 1114( I ). 
123 Ian A. Laird. NAFT4 ChajJI('/' 1/: NAFT4 ChajJIl'r 1/ Ml!els Chicken lilliI'. 2 CHI. J. ItiT'L L. 
223.226 (2001). 
124 These circumstances, as well as agrarian land reform, may be considered large-scale national-
izations. which may not require tull compensation under international law. Judge Lagergren argucs that in cases 
of tlmdamental national upheaval, full compensation would not be appropriatc if it would result in signiticant 
economic hardship tt)r the expropriating governmcnt. Judge Holt7mann rejects this view claiming that 
International Law rcquires tull compcnsation in all cases. SI'I' INA Corp. v. Iran. 8 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 373 (Aug. 
12, 1985). 
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A comparison between the language used in the ECHR and that used in 
NAFTA demonstrates the difference between the two regimes. The European 
system emphasizes the primacy of regulation by stressing that its personal 
property protection shall not "in any way impair" a state's regulatory power. 
Compensation for regulation could certainly impair such power. NAFTA 
however, only encourages environmental legislation that is "otherwise consistent 
with" the investment section. Accordingly, regulation that deprives an investor of 
his property is only appropriate when investors are compensated. 
One potentially negative side effect of a regime based on compensation 
for regulatory expropriations is that it may give corporations a perverse incentive 
to act irresponsibly. For instance, companies may be more willing to market 
products that entail potential health and safety concerns under NAFTA, knowing 
that if a state bans their product, they will be compensated. Conversely, refusing 
compensation for investments lost as a result of valid environmental legislation 
may encourage companies to internalize social and environmental concerns and 
costs. This argument is an extension of the "polluter pays principle."125 In other 
words, corporations that harm the environment must pay society for the harm 
they cause, and society should not have to pay corporations to refrain from 
hanning the environment. 126 
125 Sill! Mann and von Mollke. slIpra note 120, at 46 ("Under the polluter pays principle. the 
community effectively 'owns' the environment, and forces users to pay for damage they impose.") (quoting 
John Moffet and Francois Bregha). 
126 The first international timllulation of the polluter pays principle (PPP) is contained in the 1972 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Council Recommendation on Guiding 
Principles concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies. As stated in that report, the 
PPP means that polluters should bear the expense of public measures taken to restore the environment to an 
acceptable state. Underlying the PPP is the sense that prices paid for goods "should accurately re!leet the full 
70 
Issue NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation 
The polluter pays principle, however, is only useful as a remedial device. 
It does not prohibit investors from harming the environment per se. Rather, it 
simply states that if they do so, they must bear the cost. Since the financial 
benefits of an investment may exceed the costs to the environment, regulation 
that makes an investment useless should entail compensation equal to the value 
of the investment minus the cost of the harm averted. 
An example may be useful to clarify this point. Suppose a factory is 
constructed at a cost of $25 million. The factory emits air pollution that will cost 
the government $20 million to clean up. According to the polluter pays principle, 
the factory owner would have to pay for the cost of the c1ean-up.127 However, 
suppose that instead of requiring the factory owner to pay for the pollution it has 
caused, the government enacts a law prohibiting the operation of the factory. In 
such a case the government should compensate the investor $5 million-the 
difference between the cost of his investment and the harm averted. 
Another potential concern with Chapter 11 is that social activists will try 
to use NAFTA as an effective tool to shape policy.m This is especially true in 
areas of emerging technology, which expand faster than governments can 
regulate. Take, for example, the hypothetical case of an American lobbyist 
convincing a group of Mexican investors to open a human cloning, partial birth 
cost of [the items' I production and/or consumption." SI!I! The Pol/II/a Pm's Pl'illci/JII! liS i/ Rela/I!s to 
111/l!rJIatiOlw/ Tim/I!, Joint Working Party on Trade and the Environment, COM/ENV/TD(200 I) 44!FINAL 
(Dec. 2(02). ({\'{Ii/ah/I! at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/200Idoc.nsf (iast visited .Ian. 31. 20(5). Although the 
precise status of the PPP is currently unccrtain, it has becomc increasingly acccpted and has cven been termed 
a "gcneral principle of international environmcntal law" by some international agreemcnts. Id. 
127 The total tinancial cost of the factory would therefi.ll'c be $45 million. 
12R While such a case has not yet occurrcd, it is well within the realm of possibility. 
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abortion, and stem cell research clinic using equipment that is so specialized that 
if these practices are banned the clinic would be worthless and the entire invest-
ment lost. Banning these practices would engender enormous damages since 
constructing such a clinic would entail a large investment, and there is great 
demand for the services it would provide, even though many people view them 
as morally abhorrent. Therefore, under NAFTA, it would seem that if the 
American government (state or federal) wished to ban these activities, it would 
have to pay to do so, perhaps chilling such regulation. 
In such an extreme situation, however, it is unlikely that a NAFTA 
tribunal would grant compensation. It may point to the Vienna Treaty that 
provides that treaties be interpreted "in the light of its object and purpose."129 
Some ofNAFTA's stated objectives arc to: "(a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and 
facilitate the cross border movemcnt of goods and services betwcen the tcrrito-
ries of the Parties; (b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade 
area; (c) increase substantially investment opportunities in their territories."130 A 
tribunal may say that NAFTA was not meant to be used as a means for social 
legislation lobbying and therefore refuse compensation. However, should the 
investors in the above hypothetical have purely economic motives, this argument 
is not availablc. 131 In such a case, a tribunal may say that when the plain meaning 
129 Vicnna Convcntion, slIl'ra note 61, art 31 ( I ). 
130 Id. art 32(a). 
131 In a bordcrlinc case, thc issuc of motivation may be len to thc tribunal as thc tricr of fact. At 
Icast onc tribunal has already been asked to evaluatc the subjective intent of a party. In Mel/lilll!!.\", thc invcstor 
asked thc tribunal to tind that the State of California banned its product tllr the purpose of bolstering the 
domestic ethanol industry, and not out of environmcntal conccrn. See Methancx Corp. v. Unitcd States, 
Ni\FTJ\/UNCITRAL Trib. para. 24 (2002) (second amended statemcnt of claim). 
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of a statute leads to a result, which is "manifestly absurd or unreasonable," they 
must look to "supplementary means of interpretation."132 Accordingly, they may 
find that Chapter II was not meant to cover such situations. 133 However, the 
tribunal may say that this is analogous to any other NAFTA claim in which 
property has been rendered valueless due to regulation. Compensation may even 
be more intellectually defensible in such a case than in Metalclad. In that case, 
the government asserted an ecologically viable reason for the expropriation, 
whereas here, justification is based on a less tangible moral choice. 
Finally, a tribunal may apply equitable principles in rejecting the 
claim. Some have opined that the IUSCT often did this, instead of strictly 
construing its mandate. IJ4 However, it may not be desirable to have international 
arbitral bodies engaging in judicial activism. The Loewen tribunal explicitly 
addressed this issue in the closing paragraphs of its award. Based on the circum-
stances detailed above, the tribunal found that the Mississippi state court trial 
upon which the claim arose "was so flawed that it constituted a miscarriage of 
justice amounting to a manifest injustice as that expression is understood under 
132 NAFTA . .I'llI'm note 10. arl. 102. 
133 Bill Merkin, former U.S. negotiator stated: ""I would say NAFTA negotiators did not expect this 
provision would be used as much as it has been by private companies." Gudolsky, sllpra note 14, at 301; see 
also Todd Weiler. Arhilral alld Jlldicial /)ecisioll: The DIIl'1 Arhilrali!III, Firsl o{ils Killd alld a Ilarhillger oj 
Thillgs 10 COllie, II A\1. RI\'. I;;r'[ ARI!. IX7, 192 (2000) (""[e[urrent and former Canadian ollicials have 
cOlllmonly claimed that they seriously believed that the NAFTA's investor-state provisions would only be used 
by Canadians and Americans against measures imposed by Mexico."); David R. Haigh, Thl! M(II/agelllelli alld 
Resollliioll o{ Cross Border Disl'Ules as C{///!/(Ia/U.S. 1:'IIIer Ihl! 2/.1'1 Celllllr\,: Ch"l'ler // - Pril'{lle ParI)' \'s. 
(JOl'I!rl/IIII!IIIS, /1I)'eslor-Slale IJisl'lIIe Selllc/I/('I//: Frallkel/l'li!ill or Saji'll' r';i1)'c>, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 115, 125 
(2000) ("[Tlhere is sOllle substance to the argument that the NAFTA parties have illad)'crll!lIllr created a 
destructive agency which they now cannot control and which might, in some ways, arguably bring about their 
ruin.") (emphasis added), Bill see Strazzeri, supra note 13, at 841 ("The inclusion of Article 1110 was not 
accidental. The architects of the agreement fully knew what they were creating. "), 
134 S('i! Aldrich, Slll'/'{/ note 64, at 591. 
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international law."135 The tribunal also acknowledgcd that the human reaction 
would be to apply principles of equity, and redress the wrong suffered by the 
investor. 136 The court, however, held that without express international 
agreement, the tribunal had no power to "step from outside into the domestic 
arena."137 They argued that exceeding their mandate would damage "the viability 
ofNAFTA itself."138 
Some commentators have argued for a balancing test in which the 
importance of the regulation, the means chosen, and the extent of the act would 
all be weighed against investors' property rights.139 The Ethyl claim, discussed 
above, seems to argue for a similar test by interpreting NAFTA as requiring 
compensation for "unreasonable interference." The Third Restatement lends 
credence to this idea by including an "action that ... unreasonably interferes with 
... an alien's property" in its definition of expropriation. 140 A balancing approach 
could be used to discern between reasonable and unreasonable acts. Additionally, 
the European Court of Justice has successfully employed a similar approach. 141 
However, the text of NAFTA does not support this option. As noted above, 
Chapter 11 has a no fault provision that allows governments to expropriate, but 
requires compensation when they do so. Furthermore, it is inappropriate to 
(award). 
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135 Loewen Group v. United Stales. ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/9X/3 para. 54 (June 26, 20(3) 
136 lei. paras. 241 42. 
137 ld. para. 242. 
13X Id. 
139 See Banks, .I'llI'm nole X5, al 506. 
140 ReS rAI eM eN r (THIRD) 01 FORCI(;N RHMIONS LAW ~ 712 eml. g (19X7). 
141 Sce Banks, slIpra note 85, at 506. 
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reqUIre a non-national body to weigh social, cultural, and other intrastate 
interests. For example, it would be impossible to apply a balancing test in the 
case of the human cloning, partial birth abortion and stem cell research clinic 
discussed above. Citizens of Mexico and Canada may reach widely divergent 
opinions on these sensitive issues, as may citizens in different regions of the 
United States. An international, un-elected body should not be the final arbiter of 
the relative merits to the arguments underlying these important debates. 
Should tribunals attempt to assume this role, The Loewen tribunal's 
concerns l42 over exceeding its mandate would be greatly magnified. In Loewen, 
the tribunal had been asked to rectify an irrefutable injustice, and the only 
question was whether the tribunal should broaden its mandate to redress the 
wrong. The use of a balancing test would require tribunals to go far beyond this 
point and evaluate the merits of regulations enacted in countries to which tribunal 
members do not belong. Chapter 11 does not empower tribunals to engage in 
such debates, and they have no right to do so. 
Perhaps a better option would be to take realistic investor expectations 
into account when evaluating the right to compensation. Investments in activities 
that are likely to be highly regulated, or completely banned, would not be 
compensated for, if they arc "expropriated." Such a result could be justified by 
the fact that the investor should have known that the property would likely never 
be viable, and therefore had no value. 
142 Loewen Group v. United States. ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/9R/3 (Junc 26,2(03) (award). 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
To determine the costs and benefits of Chapter 11, the scope of the right 
to compensation granted by the phrase "tantamount to expropriation," must be 
understood. A review of tribunal decisions under NAFTA and international law 
brings us to the following summary of where the international law currently 
stands. Compensation is required when a government actor deprives a foreign 
investor of his fundamental ownership rights, i.e., the rights to usc, enjoy and 
dispose of his property, for a substantial period of time, regardless of the means, 
or reasons for the expropriation. Of course, this docs not apply to the enforcement 
of laws enacted before the investment was made. 143 In such a case, the investor 
has no right to engage in an illegal investment, and all loss is borne solely by the 
individual. 144 This definition is substantially similar to the ideas expressed in the 
Hull Doctrine. However, one difference may arise in the context of investments 
in emerging industries that are likely to be heavily regulated, or banned 
completely. Unlike in other situations, investors in these industries realize that 
their investments will be regulated, and the value of their investment is adjusted 
accordingly. 
It is understood that this definition of Chapter II forecloses the 
possibility of heavy regulation for established goods such as tobacco products l45 
143 It is consequently unlikely that court decisions will be the subject of much successful arbitra-
tion. 
144 See gel/erall)' Strazzeri, supra note 13 (arguing that compensation is not required for rights that 
an investor never had). 
145 A case has recently been tiled by a Canadian tobacco company protesting a 1998 settlelllent 
agreement between states attomey generals and the tobacco industry. requiring tobacco companies wishing to 
do busine~s in the United States to contribute money to an escrow account to compensate future plaintitl, in 
suits against the tobacco industry. Scc Grand River Enters. v. United States. Notice of Arbitration. ({mi/abll! ill 
http://www.state.gov/doculllcnts iorganization/3096I.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2(05). 
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and sports utility vehicles. Banning such goods would entail prohibitively costly 
compensation. However, it is unlikely that such regulation would be enacted even 
absent NAFTA. 
While NAFTA is generally considered to be a great economic success,146 
some worry that the investor rights provisions contained in Chapter II impede 
the ability of member states to regulate for the common good. '47 Such concerns 
may even cause other states to rethink the benefits of free trade agreements. 14R 
Nevertheless, compensation in such instances is socially desirable for 
three reasons. First, requiring compensation forces governments to internalize the 
costs ofregulation as well as the benefits, and take a wider range of interests into 
consideration when making decisions. This is especially true in an international 
context since alien investors have no formal democratic voice. 
Second, requiring those who are adversely impacted by regulation to pay 
for the regulation's benefit to the state, is inequitable. This cost should be spread 
across society.149 Historically, compensation has been required when "a given 
person has been required to give up property rights beyond his just share of the 
146 Sc(' Haigh, sl/pra note 133. at 115. 
147 Sec e.g., Liptak, sl/pra note 3. 
148 Sc(', e.g., Michael Ewing-Chow, /111'£',\'101' Proll!ctirJll ill Frl!£' Trade Agreellll!lIls: Lessoll.\' Fmlll 
Norlh America, 5 SIM; . .I. INT'!. & COMPo L. 748 ("The recent jurisprudence regarding Chapter II and expropri-
ation should therefore be a concern to Singapore as it negotiates the investment protcction clauses of the 
FTAs.").ld. 
149 Si!(' Kathlecn Ryan, Shollid Ih(' Ril!.·/ II/cillde II liil,il/gs R('gil/II!:), 2 N.Z . .I. Of EN\' II.. L. 6391 
(1998), ciled ill Kevin Guerin, Proleclioll AgaillSl G01'I!I'III11I'/Il liil""gs: COlllpo/sali(Jllj"r Regllialioll:), New 
Zealand Treasury Working Paper 0211S at 5.2 (2002) 1Il'lIi/ah/e al http://wwlV.treasury.govt.nz/workingpa-
pers!2002/twp02-IS.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,2(05) (noting that compensation provisions should be drafted to 
encouragc regulators to "spread costs widely"). 
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cost of government."150 Accordingly, compensation is not required for govern-
mental actions that spread both the burdens and the benefits across society.151 
However, compensation is appropriate when a substantial cost is borne by a small 
group of people for the general benefit of the rest of the population.152 
Finally, compensation gives individuals an incentive to invest, leading to 
great economic advantage. 153 Investment by foreigners provides capital infusion 
for domestic economies, while creating jobs in local markets. A binding 
agreement to compensate in the event of expropriation attracts foreign invest-
ment leading to these benefits. 
To be sure, the standard advanced in this paper is most similar to that 
found in American takings law, and Mexico and Canada face more institutional 
change than does the United States as a result of Chapter 11. 154 Nevertheless, the 
benefits of adhering to this standard far outweigh the potential cost for all three 
countries. 
150 William Stocbuck. A C(,lIl.'ral Thl.'olT ofl:'IIIIIII.'II! DOII/aill. 47 W"'H. L ReV. 553. 608 (1972). 
ijuo!l.'d by Guerin, supra note 149, at 3.1. 
151 See Guerin, supra note 149, at 4.1. 
152 This has been recognized as the guiding principle behind the Takings Clause or the United States 
Constitution, The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "The Finh Amendment's guarantee that private property 
shall not be taken Illr a public usc without just compensation was designed to bar Government hom Illrcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all lilirness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole." Armstrong v. United States, 64 US 40, 49 (1960). 
153 S('(' Beauvais, supra note RO. at 256 57. 
154 See sllpm part IYB.I; .\'('1.' also David Schneiderman. NAF'0J\' Takillg Rull.'.' Amcric({I1 
COllstitlltiollalislll COllies to Cwwda, 46 U. TORONTO L J. 499 (199(,); s('(' also Debra F. Guajardo, R('dl.'tining 
{he Expropriation ofa Foreigll Direc{ 1!1I'('s{lIl('n{ ill Mexico, 42 S. Tlx. L Ric.\'. 1309 (200 I). 
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